California's usury ceilings by Gary C. Zimmerman
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California's Usury Ceilings 
Improved information, increased consumer 
awareness, and a broader range of lenders 
have helped to increase competition in the 
market for consumer installment credit in 
recent decades. But California's 22-year-old 
usury statute may have had just the opposite 
effect. According to critics, the Retail Install-
ment Sales Act of 1960 (the Unruh Act) has 
restricted the ability of retailers to compete 
effectively with financial institutions provid-
ing similar types of credit, and at the same 
time has made it difficult for borrowers to 
obtain credit. 
In a high interest-rate environment, California 
retailers have been plagued with thedilemma 
either of extending credit at a loss, or of not 
extending credit and possibly losing sales. At 
a 16  Y2-percent prime business-loan rate, de-
partment stores, furniture-appliance stores 
and other reta i  lers have encou ntered borrow-
ing costs of 20 percent or more. Yet under 
the law, they themselves have been able to 
charge only 18 percent on the first $1,000 of 
their installment-credit loans, and only 12 
percent on the balance over $1,000. Thus, 
many retailers must refer customers to finan-
cial intermediaries whose lending rates are 
not covered by usury ceilings, or else extend 
credit at rates well below their own borrow-
ing costs. Either way, this means lost profit 
opportunities for stores that were once able 
to complement revenues from sales with 
income from credit operations. 
Changing environment 
Legislators have frequently viewed usury 
ceilings as a substitute for consumer infor-
mation in protecting borrowers from being 
charged exorbitant interest rates. That belief 
helped set the stage in 1960 for California's 
passage of the Retail Installment Sales Act. 
However, by setting the ceiling well above 
prevailing market-interest rates-such as a 
5-percent prime rate-the law did not limit 
either the rates charged to typical customers 
or retailers' willingness to extend credit, even 
while it prevented the charging of very high 
rates to marginal customers. 
Since 1960, however, the consumer-install-
ment credit market has changed dramatical-
ly. First, inflation has driven market interest 
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rates to, and often above, the levels consid-
ered exorbitant in the 1960 law, which was 
enacted when the inflation rate was under 2 
percent. Consumers have also become much 
more aware of  the importance of interest 
rates, as evidenced by the popularity of 
money-market funds and market-return con-
sumer deposits. In addition, the widespread 
use of  bank credit cards has improved con-
sumers' array of borrowing opportunities. 
Legislation also has led to changes in the 
consumer-loan market. The Truth In Lending 
Act standardized information concerning 
loan contracts, simplifying the process of 
shopping for and comparing loan terms. The 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act also enhanced compe-
tition, by enabling savings-and-Ioan associ-
ations to write installment credit, along with 
banks, credit unions, and finance companies. 
Yet despite all these changes, usury laws 
in California and elsewhere have remained 
relatively unchanged. 
Unintended consequences  I 
When market interest rates exceed usury ceil-
ings, lenders cannot earn a return adequate to 
compensate them for their costs and risks. 
The amount of credit supplied at the below-
market rate will fall, because lenders will 
seek to take advantage of more profitable 
lending opportunities-or lacking such op-
portunities, will reduce or even stop lending 
altogether. Moreover, lenders will seek to 
reduce the cost of providing credit by tight-
ening terms-qualifications, collateral, ma-
turity, and other standards-to reduce the 
risk of loan losses and the cost of delinquen-
cies. As a resu It of  these actions, the su pply of 
creditwill become restricted to only the most 
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creditworthy borrowers. Thus, as market 
rates approach (or exceed) the usury ceiling, 
many consumers may not be able to find 
credit at the ceiling rate. The ceiling may 
force them to borrow from unorthodox and 
even illegal lenders, at rates that may be 
higher than they would otherwise have had 
to pay. 
In California, usury ceilings have been less  I 
restrictive than in most states because the 
ceilings do not apply to all lenders, but only 
to retailers. Financial institutions operating 
without such limitations have continued to 
supply consumer credit, offsetting some of 
the reduction in supply caused by retailers' 
inability to supply credit profitably. Still, by 
forcing retailers to restrict their lending, the 
Act apparently has inconvenienced many 
households by forcing them to search for 
credit on their own, and has frustrated their 
attempts to find credit at the controlled rate. 
California statutes 
The Retail Installment Sales Act places ceil-
ings on the interest rates and fees that retail 
establishments can charge on their estimat-
ed $3 billion in consumer credit. (For com-
parison, California banks provide about $5 
billion in bank-card and check-overdraft in-
stallment credit.) The statute covers a wide 
range of retail credit, including credit from 
department stores, home-furnishings and ap-
pliance dealers, airlines and gasoline com-
panies. The Act initially allowed retailers to 
charge customers up to an annual rate of 18 
percent on the first $1,000 of installment 
(revolving) credit, with a 12-percent ceiling 
on the balance above $1,000. For the less 
typical installment (non-revolving) contract, 
the Act setthe ceil ing at 10 percent for the first 
$1,000 and 8 percent on the balance over 
$1,000. 
A temporary amendment, effective in 1981, 
raised the ceiling on the first $1,000 of re-
volving credit from 18 percent to 19.2 per-
cent, and the ceiling on the first $1,000 of 
non-revolving credit from 10 to 11  percent. 
The rates on balances in excess of $1 ,000 
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remained at the levels set in 1960. A second 
amendment (October 1981) extended the 
temporary rates through September 30, 1982, 
and lifted the cut-off  to $3,000 for credit sales 
of household furniture, furnishings, and ap-
pi iances. Yet, these temporary measures have 
provided little relief. Because it would be 
costly to implement such minor and tempo-
rary changes, and because changing the rate 
on revolving credit balances might create 
problems for customer relations, many retail-
ers have elected to continue with the original 
ceilings and cut-offs. 
losing proposition? 
Prior to the recent dramatic upsurge in inter-
est rates,  most retailers had an incentive 
to provide credit to finance big-ticket pur-
chases. Retailers could borrow funds to fi-
nance customers' purchases and hold their 
installment contracts as earning assets. Credit 
often became a profitable complement to re-
tail operations, and as such allowed retailers 
to compete favorably through lower prices. 
However, in the current environment, the 
cost of  extending new credit has become 
prohibitive. The cost of funding a loan (often 
at prime plus several percentage points), plus 
overhead expenses, administrative costs, and 
loan-loss expenses easily exceeds the 19.2-
percent ceiling rate-to say nothing of the 
12-percent ceiling for loans exceeding the 
$1,000 (or $3,000) cut-off. 
Furthermore, California retailers have found 
that writing installment contracts for resales 
to finance companies is also a losing propo-
sition. In the past, many retai lers were able to 
write contracts with terms tailored to the 
requ irements of  sales-finance companies that 
actively purchased such paper. But today, 
with market rates above the statutory cei ling, 
retailers must discount paper to induce pur-
chasers to buy the low-yielding contracts. 
The losses that retailers must suffer in this 
process have curtailed the practice and have 
forced many sales-finance firms out of the 
market. 
Faced with potential losses of sales, retailers 
have looked for other alternatives, such as accepting bank cards for purchases. How-
ever, the use of bank cards reduces retailers' 
margins, because banks charge them card-
processing fees of up to several percentage 
points. Moreover,'retailers cannot adjust 
credit limits or repayment periods, and have 
no say about eligibility for bank-card use. 
Such limitations also may reduce credit avail-
ability to some segments of the market, since 
many high-risk and first-time borrowers 
might qualify for a retail establishment's se-
cured credit line but not for an unsecured 
bank line of credit. 
Given these shortcomings of credit cards, 
some retailers instead have referred custom-
ers to banks, thrifts, or consumer-finance 
companies not subject to the Act's ceilings. 
These le'riders may lend direCtly to individ-
uals at market rates, although the installment 
paper they purchase is subject to Unruh Act 
ceilings. Thus, we have experienced a shift 
towards more direct financing of retail pur-
chases by financial institutions. In effect, the 
Act has eliminated one important group of 
lenders from the market. Moreover, it has 
reduced consumers' options for financing 
purchases, and may even have frozen out 
some consumers completely, to the extent 
that other lenders are unable or unwilling to 
increase their installment-credit portfolios. 
What next? 
What would happen if California's usury-law 
ceilings were lifted or removed? Some critics 
say that retailers would quickly raise rates, 
pricing credit out of the reach of many con-
sumers but without increasing available sup-
plies of credit. To answer the question, the 
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Legislature appointed a Retail Credit Advi-
sory Commission last year to report on the 
state's usury problem by june 30, 1982. 
Meanwhile, we may find it instructive to 
examine the installment-credit market in 
states that have recently removed usury 
ceilings. 
A New York State Banking Department study 
(February 19ft1) indicated that rates generally 
rose towards competitive market levels after 
deregulation-but that deregulation also ex-
panded the credit pool and broadened the 
options avai lable to consumers shopping 
for credit. Another survey, conducted by 
the New jersey State Banking Department, 
reached conclusions similar to those found 
by the New York study. 
Interest rates charged by California commer-
cial banks, which are not subject to Unruh 
Act ceilings, provide an indication of the 
level of retailers' rates after deregulation. At 
the August 1981  peak in rates, seven large 
California banks' charged (on average) 21.7 
percent and 22.5 percent for personal loans 
of 24 and 12 months, respectively, and 19.3 
percent for credit cards (excluding fees). Al-
though very high by historic standards, those 
competitive rates were in-line with the banks' 
cost of borrowing marginal funds, as mea-
sured by an 18.0-percent rate for large time 
certificates. The California data, like the New 
York and New jersey studies, thus indicate 
that-in a high interest-rate environment-
retail credit could become more costly but 
also more widely available in the absence of 
rate ceilings. 
Gary C. Zimmerman 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
,(Qo!lacamQunts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits ~  total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 







































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Dai!y Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Qeficiency (  -) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
3/31/82  3/24/82 
95  69 
103  11 
7  58 
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Dollar  Percent 
10,904  7.4 
12,128  9.7 
6,452  17.6 
4,907  9.5 
449  2.0 
87  5.5 
406  - 6.2 
797  - 5.1 
2,967  - 6.8 
2,391  - 7.9 
33  0.1 
15,145  19.9 
14,789  22.0 
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